POLITICIANS AND BUREAUCRATS IN BANGLADESH'S POLICY-MAKING PROCESS: A RE-INTERPRETATION

Nizam U. Ahmed*

Having descended from the Indian Civil Service, particularly its higher bureaucracy, the modern bureaucracy in Bangladesh is essentially a British legacy. During the Ayub regime (1958-1969) the administrative class dominated the policymaking process in order to promote economic development and unity in the country. This, however, resulted in the weakening of the policymaking process. Under the Mujib regime (1972-1975), the bureaucratic had to succumb to the pressures of the ruling elite and the civil service suffered from low morale and apathy. The bureaucracy achieved representation in various policymaking institutions like the Cabinet, the Planning Commission and the National Economic Council during the Zia regime (1977-1981). While Ayub's scorn for political parties and party politicians was highly discernible, the Zia government revived the political process and recognized the role of the party in the political system.

Introduction

One of the important problems confronting the modern state is identifying a way to strike a balance between the politician and the bureaucrat, the two contending elites in the policy process. Although the policy process is subject to influence and manipulation by a variety of individuals and institutions, these two sets of actors have nevertheless a special role to play. The classical view that the politician and the bureaucrat are two different kinds of people engaged in different kinds of work — the former in policy-making and the latter in policy implementation — (Wilson 1887) has been attacked, rejected and seemingly destroyed[1] (Svara 1985: 221). What has instead become conventional wisdom is that politicians and bureaucrats are both policy actors, with each one involved in the determination of ends, the choice of means and the task of balancing social forces (Aberbach et al. 1981 and 1991; Peter 1987; Campbell 1988; Dogan 1975).

The two, however, do not approach policy-making in similar ways. Nor do they have the same political skills. They may be of the same genus, but they are not of the same species (Aberbach et al. 1981: 12). "Bureaucrats are the

*Associate Professor, Department of Public Administration, University of Chittagong, Bangladesh.

more stable and conserving elite; they tend to maintain equilibrium in the policy environment. Politicians, on the other hand, are more risk-taking; they tend to inject energy and initiative into the policy process" (Aberbach et al. 1991: 203). Notwitstanding these differences, the two do not perceive policy-making in mutually exclusive terms. Bureaucrats [in the West] both acknowledge and prefer some increased degree of influence in major policy decisions by other actors (Miller 1987: 239); they also accept the basic values and premises of pluralist democracy (Putman 1975: 89-91). Politicians, on the other hand, also acknowledge the policy role of the bureaucracy as legitimate and as an accepted norm (Aberbach et al. 1981: 241).

In the Third World, however, politicians and bureaucrats often look upon each other as adversaries, and their relationship is characterized by mutual hostility and antagonism. This is especially evident in those countries where the political and bureaucratic institutions of government have had asymmetrical growth. In an imbalanced polity (dominated by the bureaucracy), political direction in the policy process tends to become more and more a bureaucratic monopoly, and as this occurs, the bureaucrats are increasingly tempted to give preference to their group interests (Riggs 1963: 126). One of the most important drawbacks of this imbalance is that it is likely to make both formulation and implementation of public policies ineffective (Riggs 1969; Pye 1966). Riggs has, therefore, suggested the introduction of the "constitutive system"[2] as a means of correcting the imbalance that exists between bureaucracy and politics in these countries.

Yet imbalance cannot be seen as a peculiarly Third World phenomenon. Nor does the formal existence of the "constitutive system" automatically guarantee that political roles and relations remain balanced.[3] Indicators of balanced or imbalanced relations are somewhat tenuous because they rely on attitudinal factors and recalled behavior rather than on direct observation (Bjorkman 1979: 118). This is not to contend that the "theory of imbalance" remains basically flawed. What, however, is observed here is that although political and bureaucratic roles exist in an uneasy pattern in an unbalanced polity, these are not mutually exclusive. Rather, as the Bangladesh experience shows, one can be seen as reinforcing the other in a number of ways. Such reinforcement, which is mostly governed by 'mutuality of interest' than by other factors, however, is likely to discourage the growth of policy entrepreneurship in government.

This article provides an account of stability and change in the politics-bureaucracy interaction in the national policy process in Bangladesh. It specifically seeks to assess the measures undertaken by the Mujib government and the Zia government to redefine the relationships between the politician and the bureaucrat in the first decade of Bangladesh independence (1971-81). Contrary to the conventional view that the politico-bureaucratic relationship in

post-liberation Bangladesh was characterized by a high degree of conflict and animosity, this article argues that it was also characterized by interdependence and reciprocity. These were, however, induced neither by psychological affinities between individuals, nor by ideological similarities. They were rather the result of interdependent converging interests.

This article is organized into four sections. The following section provides a brief account of the growth of institutionalized interaction between politics and bureaucracy in pre-liberation Bangladesh (before 1971). Sections two and three focus on identifying and evaluating the measures undertaken respectively by the Mujib government and the Zia government to balance the influence of the politician and the bureaucrat. Section four compares the policies of the two governments and concludes the paper.

Bureaucracy and Politics: The Foundation of a Relationship

Modern bureaucracy in Bangladesh is essentially a British creation. In particular, the higher bureaucracy is a lineal descendant of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) which provided the foundation of what Lloyd George called the "steel frame" of British rule in India. The ICS was practically the sole repository of power (Morris-Jones 1964: 23). To belong to it was not simply a guarantee of a good and interesting job; it was also a combination of a calling and an honor (Morris-Jones 1964: 23). Members of the ICS, who monopolized almost all policy-making positions at different levels of the governmental hierarchy, owed responsibility to none except to the authorities in England. They were responsible and considered themselves responsible only to themselves (Potter 1963: 143), at least until the 1920s when some efforts were made to bring them under popular and political control.

For example, the Government of India Act of 1919 provided for the introduction of legislative assemblies in the province and the transfer of some government departments to the control of political ministers. The Act of 1935 provided for introducing responsible government in the provinces and also for transferring all provincial departments to the control of elected ministers. The Act also introduced the concept of "ministerial responsibility," thereby making the executive and the bureaucracy accountable to the legislature. Consequent upon the introduction of democratic reforms, ministers became the political heads of different administrative departments. But their authority to initiate and formulate policies independent of the influence of the bureaucracy remained largely circumscribed.

For example, the Maxwell Committee appointed in 1937 to determine the nature of the relationship between a minister and his departmental secretary

virtually limited the role of the former to simply policy-making in important matters as decided by the secretary. Ministers were not authorized to issue orders to subordinate officers directly over the head of the secretary (Misra 1977). In the case of policy disagreement with the minister, the bureaucracy could refer any matter to the Governor. Senior bureaucrats, especially departmental secretaries, used to have regular meetings with the Governor and they were required to send to him a weekly list of all cases in which orders had been passed by a minister. The Governor could exercise "special powers" and even nullify the decisions of the legislature and elected ministers.

These limitations remained in force till the collapse of British rule in 1947. The situation did not improve even after the partition of India when the new state of Pakistan (of which Bangladesh was a part) adopted a parliamentary system of government, which presupposes structural subordination of the bureaucracy to politics. On the contrary, as Laporte (1987: 48) argued, the higher bureaucracy in Pakistan, renamed the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), not only managed to maintain its colonial prerogatives, but also extended and expanded its authority to include additional areas of concern. There were at least three major factors that accounted for the growing role of the bureaucracy in the new state of Pakistan in the first decade of independence (1947-58). These were the dominance of authority over popular sovereignty, lack of political stability, and lack of any serious generational chasm based on ideological difference between the ICS and the newly recruited members of the CSP (Callard 1959: 19-20; Goodnow 1964: 92; Braibanti 1963: 254-257).

The political and policy role of the CSP, hereafter referred to as the "administrative class," had a major boost especially after the collapse of the parliamentary system and the rise of the military to power under General Ayub's leadership in 1958. The Ayub regime (1958-69) had nothing but contempt for politicians. To contain the role of the politicians, it introduced a number of measures, the most important of which was the Elected Bodies Disqualification Ordinance promulgated in 1959. Under the terms of the Ordinance, nearly 6,500 politicians of the previous regime were disqualified from holding elective offices for seven years (Ashford 1967: 119). The attitude of Ayub did not undergo any change when he decided to civilianize his military rule by introducing, among others, a new Constitution in 1962 and holding elections for the Presidency and the national and provincial legislatures in the middle of the 1960s. Although Ayub inducted a number of politicians into the Cabinet following his election as President, he was still reluctant to allow them to play a role independently of the bureaucracy.

The political minister did not have any effective control over the bureaucracy of business in his ministry/department. A C.S.P. association memorandum noted that a minister (in central government) during the Ayubian decade owed his continuance in office to factors unrelated to his performance as

a minister. At the provincial level, the authority of the minister was more circumscribed. According to the Rules of Business, if there was any disagreement between the permanent secretary and the minister, the matter had to be referred to the centrally appointed Governor for final orders (Sayeed 1967: 111).

The administrative class, like its predecessor, i.e. ICS, also monopolized strategic policy positions not only in traditional government departments, but also in development ministries and various economic policy institutions such as the National Economic Council, the Planning Commission and public sector corporations. Two-thirds of senior positions (e.g., Deputy Secretary, Joint Secretary and Permanent Secretary) in the Secretariat were reserved for them. The administrative class thus outdistanced not only politicians, but also members of other specialized services from the seat of authority and power. Its members worked in all the ministries and departments at the top of the administrative hierarchy, irrespective of the specialized nature of the ministries concerned, and could be moved indiscriminately from health to telecommunication or from education to power development sectors (Islam 1980: 52).

Ayub justified the dominance of the administrative class in the policy-making process on two counts. First, the centralization of policy-making powers in one institution was considered necessary to promote the dominant goal of his government, i.e., economic development. Second, the administrative class was considered capable of integrating the diverse (and divisive) forces that allegedly threatened the unity of the country. The extent to which these arguments remained true is subject to debate and controversy. What is, however, clear is that the Ayub government's dependence on the administrative class weakened the policy process in at least two ways.

First, the monopoly of the administrative class over various policy institutions led to inter-bureaucratic tension and rivalry. Professionals and specialists, who found their prospects for promotion to senior policy positions blocked by the administrative class, not only resented the authority of the latter. They also sought to withhold important information considered necessary for the evolution of a viable policy development process. Second, the dominance of the bureaucracy over the various structures of government alienated the politician from the governing process and discouraged the provision of partisan inputs in the policy process. This also made the politician distrustful towards the authority of the bureaucracy and government. Whatever exchanges took place between the two (politicians and bureaucrats) remained personal in nature and they lacked institutional character.

More importantly, the Ayub government's deliberate policy of subjecting the East Pakistani, now Bangladesh, members of the administrative class to

discrimination[4] not only discouraged the growth of a "monolithic bureaucratic culture," but also caused resentment and tension within the premier bureaucracy itself. All senior positions in almost all policy-making institutions were held by the West Pakistani members of the administrative class. The so-called "development policies" pursued by the Ayub regime enriched the West (Pakistan) at the expense of the East (Pakistan), leading to the growth of a movement for regional autonomy, especially in the eastern wing of Pakistan.

The Awami League (AL) which had been spearheading the nationalist struggle since the early days of Pakistan, managed to enlist widespread public and political support in favor of its struggle for regional autonomy. It demanded not only correction of regional imbalances in the economic field, but also proportional representation in the bureaucracy and the military. But the central elites, which included the military, the elite bureaucracy, and to some extent, West Pakistani politicians, did not pay any heed to these demands. Rather, they resorted to violence to counteract the growing popularity and demands of the AL. The tug of war between the AL, which by 1971 became the dominant political force with a strong electoral and support base, and the Pakistani elites, finally resulted in the disintegration of Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh as a nation state.

Primacy of Politics and Limits of Political Control: The Mujib Regime (1972-75)

At her independence in 1971, Bangladesh opted for a Westminster system of government and adopted democracy, nationalism, secularism and socialism as the four state principles. The Constitution, which came into effect on December 16, 1972, recognized the sovereignty of the national legislature called Jatiya Sangsad (JS). However, since the AL had an absolute majority in the JS, the cabinet under the command of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Father of the Nation, emerged as the focal point of decision-making and state policy. The Prime Minster had complete control over the JS, the party, and the government.

The AL government looked upon the inherited bureaucracy with suspicion and distrust[5] and introduced a number of measures to ward off its influence in the policy process. Noteworthy among them were the replacement of bureaucrats from senior policy positions in the Planning Commission, the harbinger of socialist economy, by professional economists, and the appointment of business executives and professionals as heads of different public corporations, which witnessed a phenomenal growth in post-liberation Bangladesh.[6] In the past, these institutions were dominated by the bureaucracy. It is also alleged that a large number of partymen whom one may call "irregulars" were recruited to man and run the various abandoned industries brought under public ownership and control after the liberation. Irregulars'

entry into the regular public service was also not uncommon, although it was not rampant. Like politicians, planners and professionals also had strong reservations about the role of the bureaucracy in the new state. Both attempted to short-circuit the authority of the bureaucracy, but none succeeded in any major way in its mission for reasons to be explored subsequently.

Suffice it to note here that the AL government had also undertaken a number of measures to influence the behavior of the bureaucracy and to make it responsive to political directions. For example, the new government withdrew the constitutional recognition of security of tenure that public servants used to enjoy in the pre-liberation days. Also a new law, commonly referred to as the Presidential Ordinance No. 9 (PO 9), introduced immediately after independence, provided for dismissing public servants without providing them with any opportunity to appeal to higher authorities (Rahman 1974; Ahmed 1980). A National Pay Commission (NPC), appointed in 1973, recommended to bring the highest and lowest pay difference from 2:28.1 to 2:11.5 (GOB 1973a: 87); while a high-powered reform body called the Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee (ASRC) recommended the abolition of the erstwhile provision for reservation of senior positions in government for members of the administrative class (GOB 1973b). The ASRC also opted for a unified structure in which senior positions in the public service would remain open to members belonging to any service, and to be filled in on the basis of merit alone. The recommendations of these two bodies were, by far, the most radical measures ever suggested to rationalize and invigorate the public service in the sub-continent.

Critics, however, argued that these measures were introduced not to overhaul the bureaucracy to enable it to adapt to the changing priorities of the new nation, but to secure an insecure, subservient, spiritless and sycophant civil service which could serve the interests of the ruling elite (Barua 1978: 78). It is also alleged that bureaucrats had to succumb to pressures from the ruling elite in complete disregard of rules and regulations. Barua observed that orders of the ruling elite could not be objected to, and the civil service could not have an honest difference of opinion with superiors and colleagues (Barua 1978: 79). The net result was low morale and lack of interest among the public servants (Ahmed 1980: 147).

It should, however, be observed that the bureaucracy did not receive the instructions of the politicians "cap-in-hand"; as Rahman (1974) observed, the bureaucracy had still powerful cards, e.g., skill, service links, middle-class background and above all, past record, to play. But it could not challenge the other contenders (for power and influence), especially in the initial days, not only for exogenous (hostile political environment), but also for indigenous reasons. It was organizationally weak, and in particular, faction-ridden. After the liberation, role conflict within the bureaucracy not only became largely

manifest, but also assumed several dimensions. Thus, cleavages and schisms were noticeable between the collaborators (those who worked for Pakistan government during the war) and patriots (those who served the government in exile), between the erstwhile central government bureaucrats and provincial government bureaucrats, between the generalist and the specialist, and also between the locals and expatriates (Jahan 1974: 129-31; Maniruzzaman 1979: 47-49). Khan and Zafarullah, two leading students of bureaucratic behavior in Bangladesh, provide a succinct account of the nature of conflict in the following way:

> The CSPs, sensitive to their role in the erstwhile Pakistan, were apprehensive of the assault on their power, status and prestige and argued unambiguously for retaining an elitist service. Members of the EPCS wanted their positions elevated to those of the CSPs. Specialists and technocrats had obvious reasons to be hostile against both the CSPs and EPCSs who, in their opinion, were nothing more than amateur generalists bent upon intruding into technical specialism (1984: 118).

The political leadership, it is alleged, did not take any concerted measure to manage such conflicts. Rather it took full advantage of the division among the bureaucrats belonging to different cadres. Barua (1978: 79) argued that the government sometimes gave its blessings to one and sometimes to another, thus making it impossible for the bureaucracy to work as a coherent functioning body. He further observed that the entire administrative machinery consisted of nothing but a mass of helpless human beings who were marking time in a vacuum with various authorities bullying them and the PO 9 hanging over their heads (Barua 1978: 77).

It can, however, be argued that although the League managed to break the stranglehold of the bureaucracy over the structures of government and policy-making at the national level, the relation between politics and bureaucracy still fell short of a union. The League politics and policies were directed more towards creating what one may call a "strong psychological pressure" upon the bureaucracy than towards exterminating it. The AL did not propose any wholesale replacement of the bureaucracy by any other institutional device. Nor was there any major intrusion of politics, especially in the higher rungs of the regular bureaucracy. Irregulars' entry into the bureaucracy remained confined to lower echelons in the public service; while the higher bureaucracy still had control over most of the command positions, particularly in the Secretariat, the hub of public policy-making.

Thus, most of the secretaries were still being recruited from the administrative class.[7] Although a few professionals/specialists were initially recruited to head one or two ministries, they were withdrawn within a short time. In general, there was no lateral entry into the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. For substantive public policy-making, individual ministers were thus more dependent upon the higher bureaucracy which possessed skills and

expertise, and more importantly, controlled the various sources of information. Although ministers were allowed to have private secretaries at public expense, the latter were essentially political than policy advisers, reinforcing the political dimensions of the Minister's decisions and strategy. They shared the Minister's party background and political language and acted as a channel of communication between the Minister and his party and not the other way around, i.e., as a buffer between the Minister and his permanent secretary.

It is true that the scope of ministerial decision-making independent of the influence of other agencies was somewhat limited, and this was due to two reasons: the inclination of the Prime Minister to centralize policy and executive functions in his office, and the emergence of the Planning Commission as a "superministry." The need to intervene in matters which were within the jurisdiction of the individual ministries was considered by the Prime Minister as having been thrust upon him by the inefficiency and lack of initiatives of the ministers (Islam 1980: 49). However, although the ministers complained that his interference was unnecessary, there was no open defiance of his authority either from the politician or from the bureaucrat for the simple reason that such a move was fraught with serious risks. Hence, both groups tried to seek frequent contacts and proximity with the Prime Minister (Islam 1980: 49).

On the other hand, the Planning Commission, which was responsible for the coordination of inter-ministerial policies and programs, also absorbed some of the traditional ministerial functions, e.g., allocation of resources to executive agencies. The Commission often bypassed the ministries while making recommendations to the cabinet for allocations to executive agencies. Neither the political minister nor the bureaucrat accepted such an interventionist role of the Commission; hence, both groups resented its authority. Indeed, they often succeeded in reopening the issues and repeated their points of view in the Cabinet meetings when they felt that their views were neglected by the Commission (Islam 1980: 50).

The Commission also changed its initial style of behavior when it recognized that the bureaucracy still had the ultimate power to frustrate its policy proposals or the decisions of the cabinet. To minimize the resistance of ministerial actors, the Commission, especially after its first year of operation, seldom made policy proposals without consultation and discussions with the ministries or agencies involved in the particular policy or the program (Islam 1980: 58). As the Deputy Chairman of the Commission observed:

> It was learnt through experience that policy prescriptions or recommendations for changes which did not arise from the felt needs of the ministries or sectors were not likely to be accepted and if forced upon the unwilling ministries, could be defeated in their implementation. The ministries had to be persuaded that changes were in their interest and until this persuasion was complete and their conviction dawned, no amount of cabinet resolutions was to be of much avail (Islam 1980: 70).

What becomes evident is that the apparent primacy of politics did not undermine the policy influence of the bureaucracy altogether. Nor did the latter always play a subservient role. In fact, the conventional view that the bureaucracy was alienated from the sources of power and policy is only partially correct. Critics appear to have overestimated the intrusion of politics into what was once considered to be the prerogative of the bureaucracy. Referring to the public sector, Sobhan and Ahmad (1980: 532) observed that contrary to public belief, senior executives [in the public sector] were not friends, relatives and political hacks appointed by the ruling party as acts of pure patronage. Nor did professionals monopolize policy positions in the public sector.

For example, Sobhan and Ahmed's estimate shows that of the 76 chief executives (chairmen) of different public corporations appointed during 1972-75, more than one-third (28) were generalists recruited from the regular civil service; while four had military backgrounds. Only one was a political appointee (1980: 535-36). Although professionals initially outnumbered others as heads of corporations, they were subsequently replaced by generalist bureaucrats. The tendency to replace professionals with generalists indicated an erosion of confidence within the top leadership about professionals (Sobhan and Ahmen 1980: 534). The bureaucracy also thwarted the move by the planners and professionals to devolve greater power and autonomy on the corporation. Despite repeated attempts, the political leadership failed to frame a Rules of Business demarcating the allocation of business between different ministries and redefining the relationship between ministries and public corporations. The main opposition came from the members of the administrative class who, with the tacit support of some Cabinet members, successfully resisted the attempt to change the status quo.

The administrative class also was not a major victim of PO 9. In January 1972, 53 senior civil servants were dismissed from the service for receiving civil awards from the government of Pakistan during the liberation war. But all of them except two were reinstated a few days later (Ahmed 1980: 146). Also, a large number of public servants dismissed under the provisions of PO 9 during July-November, 1974 were mostly lower-level employees. Although some of them were middle rank bureaucrats, none was a senior public servant. The 'draconian' law was thus aimed more at pressuring the bureaucracy to respond to political demands.

The attitude of the AL towards the role of the bureaucracy was thus characterized by ambivalence. Although it censored the bureaucracy even in public, the policy of the AL towards reforming it fell short of a revolutionary nature. The recommendations of the ASRC, if accepted, could have provided a prelude to the introduction of a classless bureaucratic structure, which was consistent with the AL; in particular, the planners' vision could have mitigated the generalist-specialist controversy that still plagued the administrative

system. But the AL decided to follow the status quo. Moreover, when the AL turned towards the bureaucracy to find ways to compensate the losses arising from the inefficient management of the economy, the latter managed to achieve a major trade-off. In exchange for its support for reviving efficiency in the administration of government functions, the bureaucracy could influence the AL leadership to shelve the report of the ASRC permanently (Maniruzzaman 1979: 52). It still is a secret document, although many of its recommendations are well known, at least to academics, researchers and senior public servants.

The government also did not give effect to the recommendations of the NPC, especially those related to fixing the pay and other benefits of senior public servants. As stated earlier, the NPC recommended an egalitarian pay structure. The government implemented immediately those recommendations that related to increasing the wage/salary of lower-level employees. Only the pay scales for grades X to V (clerical, messengerial and entry level officers) were given effect. But that did not affect the higher public servants in significant ways. The latter continued to receive higher salaries and more benefits, although compared to pre-liberation days, they were receiving less. It is alleged that the senior bureaucrats, especially the erstwhile CSPs and EPCSs (members of the administrative class), prevented the total implementation of the NPC proposals (Khan and Zafarullah 1980: 1189).

It is interesting to note that although the AL government sought to redefine the relations between the politicians and bureaucrats at the national level, the task of policy-making and administration at the local level remained essentially a bureaucratic exercise. No measure was taken to democratize local government at the district and sub-district levels; hence these units remained under bureaucratic tutelage. The government relied upon the prefectoral bureaucracy to implement its policies and programs and to formulate policies for local development, and in particular, to stabilize its rule in the locality. To resort to other alternatives was fraught with risks and dangers. The trade-off, the exchange between politics and bureaucracy, thus helped reinforce the interests of both. The bureaucracy succeeded in halting the process of democratization or reorganization in exchange for its support to stabilize the rule of the AL in the locality (Ahmed 1989).

The ambivalent attitude of the League towards the bureaucracy did not apparently change when Sheikh Mujib decided to abolish the parliamentary system altogether and to introduce a "one party Presidential rule" in January 1975. The fourth amendment to the Constitution,[8] which provided for a radical change in party-government relationship, however, did not propose any radical change in the structure of the central bureaucracy. Nor did it totally isolate the bureaucracy from the party and the national policy process. Nearly one-fifth of the central committee members of the new national party called Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BKSAL) were drawn from the bureaucracy. To

some extent, it was an attempt towards a possible fusion of bureaucratic and political roles.

The post-liberation politics-bureaucracy trade-off had some historical antecedents too. In the pre-liberation days, the elite bureaucracy, or at least a part of it, supported the nationalist struggle spearheaded by the AL. As Maniruzzaman (1979: 48) observes, "the Bengali members of the CSP [administrative class] articulated the demands of East Pakistan when the formal politics was banned during the early years of Ayub rule. In the late 1960s, most of them became sympathetic to the Bengali demand for autonomy." Ahmed observed that many of them personally maintained good terms with Sheikh Mujib, supplied secret information to the AL leadership and provided materials which helped the Sheikh to sharpen his case for autonomy (1980: 142).

Jahan (1973: 95) also argues that the limitations placed upon the political process and the absence of Bengali representation in the military (during the Pakistan rule) meant that the Bengali [higher] civil servants were the only substantial Bengali group participating in national affairs; hence, by default, they became the chief spokesmen for Bengali interests in national decision-making. Moreover, a large number of the then Bengali members of the administrative class were the products of nationalist movements. Some of them also were activists, espousing the principles of egalitarianism, liberty and other important democratic values in the pre-liberation days. Some of them had some kind of "psychological affiliation" with the AL-led nationalist movement. As Abedin notes, "before entering the public services, most of Bengali members of the [superior] services usually remained associated with or at least intimately aware of the issues that were involved in different [nationalist] movements. Their beliefs and attitudes as government officers were, therefore, influenced in varying degrees by these issues and reminiscences of their student life" (1973: 99).

This is, however, not to suggest that the bureaucracy did not have any 'particularistic interest' of its own. To a certain extent, it supported the nationalist struggle for self-preservation; its support was intended to promote the long-term interest of its members. As we observed in an earlier section, the West Pakistani bureaucrats had almost a monopoly control over various structures of government and decision making; while their East Pakistani counterparts were alienated from sources of power and influence. Thus, those (Bangladesh) who could not fare well in rising to higher positions supported the nationalist cause with the expectation that they would be rewarded once liberation was achieved. Indeed, some got their reward, but to achieve that they had to work for the Bangladesh government in exile. But this policy of patronizing the "patriots" caused a new kind of factionalism within the bureaucracy after liberation.

What is evident from our discussion in this section is that the apparent primacy of politics over bureaucracy did not neutralize the policy influence of

the bureaucracy altogether. Indeed, as we have seen, the bureaucracy generally resented the encroachment of ministerial policy functions by other agencies, especially by the Planning Commission, and often succeeded in resisting the quest of professionals for greater involvement in policy-making. The AL also had all along remained ambivalent in its attitude towards the bureaucracy. But its inclination to make the bureaucracy the scapegoat for what were essentially party political failures, and censoring it in public meetings (by the Prime Minister), while relying on it to perform the much needed regime maintenance functions, made the bureaucracy distrustful towards the political authority, if not openly defiant to it.

The AL thus failed to utilize the latent creative and managerial capability of the bureaucracy, especially in the early years of independence. The evidence here shows that the AL did not consider its relationship with the bureaucracy as a *zero-sum* game. But its policies did not make the interaction a *positive sum* game either. The resulting consequence was that neither the bureaucracy nor the party could contribute to the development of a coherent policy network, where the roles of various actors would become institutionalized.

The Zia Regime (1977-1981): Revival of Bureaucratic Polity?

The rise to power of General Ziaur Rahman, the then Chief of Army Staff, after a series of military coups which followed the overthrow of the Awami League in August 1975,[9] marked the beginning of the restoration of the "steel frame" (Islam 1984: 558). The infamous PO 9 which, as observed earlier, provided for the dismissal of officials without any right of appeal, was withdrawn. Some of the officials dismissed under the provisions of the PO 9 were reinstated and the bureaucracy was given constitutional recognition. From the early days of General Zia's rule, the bureaucracy also succeeded in achieving representation in various policy making institutions, for example, the Cabinet, Planning Commission, and the National Economic Council.

Some have argued that the Zia government was fundamentally a resurrection of the administrative state under Ayub Khan in Pakistan (see Islam 1984: 558; Jahan 1980: 201). One can, however, find two major differences between the Ayub government and the Zia government, both of which were said to be instrumental in introducing/reviving a bureaucratic polity in Bangladesh. First, unlike Ayub who, as we saw earlier, had nothing but contempt for political parties and party politicians, the Zia government decided to revive the political process quite early and recognized the role of the party in the political system. In 1976 it partially withdrew the legal restriction imposed in 1975 on party and political activities. After the Presidential election in 1978 in which Zia had a decisive victory, all restrictions on the operation of party activities were withdrawn.

In 1978, Zia created a new party called the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The BNP was basically an umbrella organization and composed of people of diametrically opposed beliefs: officials, non-officials, socialists, non-socialists, Islamists and secularists (Haque 1980: 224). Despite the diversity in the political and ideological background and orientation of its members, the BNP, under Zia's chairmanship and state patronage, gradually emerged as a cohesive organization. More importantly, unlike Ayub who, while holding the presidency of the Muslim League, paid only lip service to its operation, Zia took an active interest in building the party. He visited the party's national headquarters more or less on a regular basis, organized training programs for party members, and himself assumed the role of a trainer. In the 1979 parliamentary elections, the party won more than a two-thirds majority of the seats.

More importantly, the revival of the political process and, in particular, the victory of the BNP in the parliamentary elections, provided the prelude to a gradual, albeit limited, change in government-bureaucracy relationship. After the elections, Zia was more inclined to work through the party rather than through the bureaucracy. It was a point on which training and ethos allowed for little tolerance of interference of politicians in the administration (Franda 1981: 8). Several senior bureaucrats even became infuriated due to his policy of bypassing regular administrative channels to get things done and also picking people from outside the bureaucracy and assigning them positions of responsibility (Franda 1981: 8). But their scope to obstruct government policies was likely to diminish because of the fact that the entire bureaucratic structure was also subject to scrutiny.

Second, unlike Ayub, who overemphasized the role of the administrative class, the Zia government sought to democratize the bureaucratic structure. The legal monopoly of the members of the administrative class came under serious challenge when the government appointed an Administrative Reform Commission to overhaul the bureaucratic structure at the national level. The Commission, headed by a retired senior bureaucrat recommended, among others, an open and integrated bureaucratic structure, and argued against reserving any senior position within the bureaucracy for any cadre or class (GOB 1977: 43-80). It thus disparaged the tall claims of the generalists and advocated the "new class of technocrats," equal pay, equal status, and appropriate level of participation in the decision-making structure (GOB 1977: 39-41).

Government accepted the recommendations of the Commission and created a "top flight think tank," called "senior policy pool" in 1980. Any public servant, irrespective of service or cadre, and with a minimum of ten years of class 1 service, was entitled to join the pool after qualifying in a special examination conducted by the Public Service Commission. The policy pool thus purportedly stood for free and open representation for all the services of Bangladesh in the key positions in the secretariat and to that extent, it represented a step which

was forward-looking and democratic (Ahmed 1981: 4). The 1980 Senior Policy Pool order thus represented a sharp challenge to the domination of the administrative class in government decision-making and accorded to the specialist and the professional an equality of opportunity to rise to the highest policy-making positions within the bureaucracy.

It is thus evident from the above that the various reforms that the Zia government introduced to democratize the political system and the bureaucracy were at variance with the policies carried out by the Ayub government. These measures were necessary to diversify the sources of policy advice and information. The Zia government, for example, needed the support of professionals and specialists to make its national development policies workable. But such support could not be expected to be forthcoming unless the authority system in the bureaucracy was changed and the specialist/professionals were given some scope for upward advancement to senior policy positions. The introduction of the Senior Policy Pool represented a "big leap forward," especially from the specialist/professional point of view.

But in its effort to win the support and confidence of the specialists, the Zia government was also cautious enough not to alienate the administrative class either. It took three years to give effect to the recommendations of the Administrative Reform Commission to introduce the senior policy pool. Such delays helped most of the members of the administrative class, especially the CSPs, to acquire the required service experience to get encadred in the pool without appearing in the special examination conducted by the Public Service Commission.

On the other hand, the revival of the political process was necessary not only to make room for partisan input into the policy-making process, but also to bring the governmental performance under policy scrutiny. Unlike the first JS, which was monopolized by the AL, the second JS had nearly one-third of members from the opposition. The JS could, at least theoretically, become a forum for debate and discussion on important public issues and policies. Moreover, the decision of the government to broadcast the summary of the proceedings of the JS on radio and TV, and to hold JS sessions for at least six months in a year, also had the theoretical potential to subject the various government policies to public scrutiny and discussion.

The Zia government thus differed not only from the Ayub government, but also from the AL in both these respects. The AL dominance of the political process in the early years of independence atrophied both politics and policy in at least two ways. First, the overzealous attempts of the AL to limit the working of opposition parties to a minimum discouraged the public scrutiny of public policies and governmental performance. Any serious opposition to the AL policies was considered as anti-state activities, hence, subject to governmental repression.

Second, the monopoly of the AL in the JS paradoxically made it impotent. In the absence of any viable opposition, the possibility of the JS engaging in serious debates on government policies and proposals was limited. The behind-the-scenes debates or deliberations in the party meetings were important, but they were infrequently held and were not open to the public (Islam 1980: 48-49). Nor could party members seriously debate government policies in the JS because the constitution imposed certain restrictions on their behavior.

Thus, any member who voted against the party to which he/she belonged and/or abstained from voting whole in JS would lose membership automatically (GOB 1972). The constitutional provisions of party discipline and the single party domination limited the role of the JS to rubber stamping the decisions of the executive government (Sobhan 1993). In the first three years of parliamentary rule the JS neither worked as a check on government, nor did it mirror public opinion (Jahan 1980: 111). Parliamentary sessions were rather dull affairs (Jahan 1980: 111). Although the BNP members in the second JS also faced the same constitutional constraint, the presence of about one-third of members from the opposition at least provided some counterweight.

The above discussion, however, is not intended to argue that General Zia was a full-blown democrat. Nor is it to contend that the political process that he initiated was without faults. A number of limitations could still be found. For example, the President and his Council of Ministers remained immune from Parliamentary control. Cabinet members were appointed by the President and they owed their allegiance to him, not to the JS. The President could also summon, prorogue and dissolve the JS. The party-government relationship also remained imbalanced with the latter exercising more control over the former. As the party president, Zia had the absolute power over the various standing committees. In short, all important party and government policy-making powers were concentrated in the presidency.

One can argue that General Zia's move simultaneously to reform the political and administrative systems and his inclination to exercise centralized control over important party and government policies were aimed at establishing an "imperial presidency." In his search for that goal, Zia did not rely upon a single source of support. Rather, his reforms were intended to reduce the risk of the monopolization of policy functions and influence by a single set of actors, as it was clear during the Ayub period, when the administrative class had an edge over the others, or during the Sheikh Mujib era, when the AL politicians had theoretically a legal supremacy over the bureaucracy.

The policy process which had the theoretical potential to become more competitive, was likely to provide some benefits to the Zia government. Zia used several channels of decision-making and tried to reduce his dependence upon a single source of support. But before the competitive policy roles of the different

actors could become institutionalized, Zia was assassinated in an abortive military coup in May 1981. Although the fragile democratic process survived for a few months following his death, it was nevertheless terminated in March 1982 by the military under the leadership of General Ershad, the then Army Chief of Staff.

Politics, Bureaucracy and Policy Process: A Comparative Overview

This paper has revealed that there have been a number of shifts and contrivances in politics-bureaucracy interaction in the national policy process in Bangladesh over the decades. At the risk of oversimplification, we may term them as *bureaucratic entrepreneurship, politicdl entrepreneurship and presidential leadership*. The evidence presented here shows that there was not a wholesale replacement of the pre-liberation bureaucratic entrepreneurship by political entrepreneurship, despite the primacy of politics in the early years of independence. Nor did it accelerate the growth of 'policy entrepreneurship' in government either. As we have already seen, the Prime Minister not only remained ambivalent in his attitude towards the bureaucracy, but he also did not have enough confidence in his ministerial colleagues, as was evident from the gradual erosion of the cabinet as a collective decision-making body, and the consequent centralization of policy and executive functions by the Prime Minister.

The ministerial incumbent, who remained disadvantaged (compared with the bureaucracy) both in terms of knowledge and substantive policy expertise because of the absence of a tradition of responsible government, also did not have the opportunity to improve his skills even after the liberation. Rather, he remained handicapped in exercising policy functions independently. The overwhelming authority of the Prime Minister reduced the degree of initiative and enterprises of ministers in many cases. They were afraid of making mistakes, hence, of being taken to task by the Prime Minister for their errors. The chief casualty was, however, the sense of joint responsibility of the cabinet as well as the process of "learning by doing" (Islam 1980: 49).

On the other hand, the emergence of the Planning Commission as a "supra" policy body was also likely to restrict the growth of policy entrepreneurship in government. This is, however, not to argue that the policy recommendations of the Commission lacked creativity and rational judgement. Nor is it to contend that the administrative ministries always remained reluctant to provide the necessary policy inputs to the Commission. The main argument is that the technical rationality of a policy and its political feasibility often conflicted with each other mainly because of lack of effective communication between the Commission and the political leadership. The top leadership of the Commission was not a part of the political

leadership. Nor was it willing to assume a direct political role (Islam 1980: 49). The consequence was that its recommendations were not adequately communicated to party members or ministerial incumbents. Since party meetings were infrequently held and the ministerial incumbents were often exhorted by the Prime Minister, the recommendations of the Commission did not have widespread acceptance among different actors.

The Prime Minster's inclination to centralize policy functions and to rely upon the policy advice of the Commission had some other negative consequences, too. It discouraged debates over policies within the party machinery itself. Although the strategy of centralization was aimed at keeping the dissent within the party hierarchy to a minimum, it caused more harm than good. The AL not only lost alternate channels of feedback over its policies, but also in effect caused resentment among its members at different levels of the party hierarchy. Moreover, the AL's lack of commitment to its stated goals and determination to resolve and overcome whatever conflicts existed between its various interest groups compounded the problem.

On the other hand, the Zia government's policy towards establishing an imperial presidency, as we observed earlier, had given him some advantages over his predecessor. Although it disproportionately relied upon the administrative class for policy advice, the government did not isolate the other contenders altogether. On the contrary, it generated conflicts among the various actors in the policy process, while retaining the final authority to resolve them. Each sought to improve its access to the presidency. However, since the BNP was still at its embryonic stage, the party politician remained at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the bureaucracy. Before it could get a big push, the government was overthrown from power.

On the whole, the shift from bureaucratic entrepreneurship to political entrepreneurship or to the third spectrum, was essentially short-lived. As a consequence, the bureaucracy, especially the administrative class, could still exercise more policy influence than the other actors. However, if the role of the party in the policy process had atrophied over time, the bureaucracy did not prosper either, especially from the standpoint of generating creative policies and not merely exercising power. In the absence of any countervailing political authority which could promote alternative policy goals and provide policy guidance, the bureaucracy became risk aversive. Precedence rather than creativity thus characterized the bureaucratic policy-making process. Since a shift towards creativity was likely to generate conflicts and make the process subject to influence by varied actors, the bureaucracy generally chose to follow the status quo.

Moreover, the long dominance of the administrative class over the other subsystems had given rise to various irrationalities within the bureaucratic system itself. Its inclination to define its role vis-a-vis the other bureaucracies in mutually exclusive terms made the latter antagonistic towards it. Each tried

to enhance its zone of influence at the expense of the others, and often remained in conflict with the other. The rise of trade unionism within the public service exacerbated the level of conflict and made the traditional authority system within the bureaucracy largely ineffective. The absence of any effective authority, e.g., a cross regulator[10] which could impose its decisions over the conflicting actors, compounded the problem.

Notes

[1]Recent reappraisal suggests that Wilson did not invent the dichotomy. Nor can it be seen as irrelevant. The dichotomy model has persisted for a number of reasons. For details, see Rabin and Bowman (1984); Svara (9185); Campbell and Peters (1988).

[2]The term "constitutive system" encompasses as subcomponents an elected assembly, an electoral system and a party system. For elaborations, see Riggs (1969).

[3]Some argue that the bureaucracy can exercise disproportionate influence in the policy process even in western democracies which are often seen as classic examples of balanced systems. Christoph (Dogan 1975: 29-62), for example, maintains that policy is nothing more than the political activity of civil servants; while Rourke (1976) goes further in arguing that bureaucratic politics rather than party politics has become the dominant theater in modern states.

[4]For details of East-West (Pakistan) imbalance, see Ahmed (1980); Jahan (1973).

[5]Jahan's study (1976) shows that members of the first JS elected in 1973 looked upon the bureaucrats with suspicion and distrust. They observed that bureaucrats were aloof, condescending, corrupt and power-hungry (Jahan 1976: 367-368). But the bureaucrats' image of politics and politicians was also no less negative. They returned the compliment by saying that the politician was corrupt, interfering, self-interested, ignorant and obstructionist (Ahmed 1977).

[6]In March, 1972, three months after the liberation of Bangladesh, the government took over public ownership of all industrial units abandoned by the Pakistanis with assets over Taka 1.5 million, and also nationalized all units owned by textiles, jute manufacturing and textile manufacturing. To manage and control these various industrial undertakings, the government set up a number of corporations, each of which was headed by a government appointed chairman. For details of politics and problems of nationalized enterprises in Bangladesh, see Sobhan and Ahmed (1980).

[7]In the changed context of Bangladesh liberation, the concept "administrative class" is to be redefined. As it is evident from Khan and Zafarullah's statement (1980: 10), the latent conflict between the CSPs and members of other functional services became largely manifest after the liberation. The CSPs were not only outnumbered by members of other central services and the provincial elite service, but the latter, in effect, managed to occupy some key secretarial and district positions which were previously filled in by the former. The CSPs, however, still held "mandarin" positions in most cases for the simple reason that, as Rahman (1974) argued, they were among the very few trained administrators that the country had at the time of independence. Although their preeminent influence waned to some extent, theory nevertheless had still more proximity with the formal policy maker, i.e. the Minister. However, since CSPs lost their natural claim over senior policy positions, the term administrative class is redefined here as consisting of not only members of the former CSP, but also those of other central elite services and the members of the provincial civil service (EPCS).

[8]Consequent upon the fourth amendment to the Constitution, the parliamentary system of government was replaced by a presidential system. More importantly, all political parties, excepting

the ruling AL, renamed Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BKSAL), were banned, and the entire governmental authority was centralized in the presidency. Sheikh Mujib, who assumed the presidency, also became chairman of the party. He had the power to remove judges of the Supreme Court and also had the right to withhold assent to a bill passed by the JS, thus reducing the latter into a useless forum. For details see Ahmed (1984).

[9]The Mujib government was overthrown from power in a military coup on 15 August 1975. The new government, headed by Mustaq Ahmed and backed by the army, remained in power for only three months, when it was toppled by another army mutiny on 7 November 1975 which, in turn, led to the overthrow of the new government and brought General Zia to the forefront of Bangladesh government and politics.

[10]Thoenig (1977: 177) defined cross regulation "as dynamic process through which compromises are imposed from outside by the intervention of an external actor whose activity and legitimacy are different from those of the parties involved. More than a mediator, he enters the decision situation as an "authoritative regulator." What we refer to here is a 'political authority' whose legitimacy has widespread acceptance across the different sub-systems within the bureaucratic system itself.

References

Abedin, N.
1973 *Local Administration and Politics in Modernizing Societies.* Bangladesh and Pakistan, Dhaka: NIPA.

Aberbach, J., R. Putman, and B. Rockman
1981 *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Aberbach, J., D. Muzger, and B. Rockman
1991 Bureaucrats and Politicians: A Report on the Administrative Elite Project. *Australian Journal of Public Administration* 50 (2).

Ahmed, E.
1981 *Development Administration in Bangladesh.* Dhaka, CENTAS.

1980 *Bureaucratic Elites in Segmented Economic Growth.* Bangladesh and Pakistan, Dhaka: University Press Limited.

Ahmed, M.
1984 *Bangladesh: The Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.* Dhaka: University Press Limited.

1977 Public Administration and Bureaucracy in Bangladesh. *The Bangladesh Times* (21 April-6 May).

Ahmed, N.
1989 Government Politics and Village Reform in Bangladesh. *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 55 (3).

Ashford, D.
1967 *National Development and Local Reform.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Barua, T.K.
1978 *Political Elites in Bangladesh.* Las Vegas: Peter Long.

Bjorkman, W. J.
1979 *The Politics of Administrative Alienation.* Delhi: Ajanta Books.

Braibanti, R. (ed.)
1963 *Asian Bureaucratic Systems: Emergent From British Imperial Tradition.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Callard, K.
1959 *Political Forces in Pakistan, 1947-58.* New York: Institute of Pacific Relations.

Campbell, C.
1988 The Political Roles of Senior Officials in Advanced Democracies: A Review Article. *British Journal of Political Science* 18 (2).

Campbell, C. and G. Peters
1988 The Politics/Administration Dichotomy: Death or Merely Change. *Governance* 1 (1).

Dogan, M. (ed.)
1975 *The Mandarins of Western Europe: The Political Role of Top Civil Servants.* N.Y.: Sage Publishers.

Franda, M.
1981 *Bangladesh Nationalism and Ziaur Rahman's Presidency: Domestic Order.* American Universities Field Staff Report No. 7.

Goodnow, H.
1964 *The Civil Service of Pakistan: Bureaucracy in a New Nation.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Government of Bangladesh (GOB)
1977 *Report of the Pay and Services Commission, Part 1: Services.* Dhaka: Cabinet Division.

1973a *Report of the National Pay Commission.* Dhaka: Ministry of Finance.

1973b *Report of the Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee.* Dhaka: Cabinet Division.

1972 *The Constitution of the Peoples's Republic of Bangladesh.* Dhaka: Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs.

Haque, A.
1980 Bangladesh in 1979: Cry for a Sovereign Parliament. *Asian Survey* 20 (2).

Islam, N.
1980 *Development Planning in Bangladesh: A Study in Political Economy.* Dhaka: Oxford University Press.

Islam, S.
1984 The State in Bangladesh Under Zia. *Asian Survey* 24.

Jahan, R.
1980 *Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues*. Dhaka: University Press Limited.

1976 Members of Parliament in Bangladesh. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1.

1974 Bangladesh in 1973: Management of Factional Politics. *Asian Survey* 14 (2).

1973 *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*. N.Y.: Columbia University Press.

Khan, M.M. and H. Zafarullah
1984 *Major Administrative Reforms in Bangladesh Civil Service, 1972-81: Review and Evaluation*. Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium on Asian Studies. Hongkong: Asian Research Service.

1980 *Politics and Bureaucracy in New Nation: Bangladesh*. Dhaka: CENTAS.

LaPorte, R.
1978 *Power and Privileges*. Berkeley, University of Southern California Press.

Maniruzzaman, T.
1979 Administrative Reforms and Politics within the Bureaucracy in Bangladesh. *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 17 (1).

Miller, C.
1987 State Administrators' Perception of the Policy Influence of the Other Actors. *Western Political Quarterly* 47 (3).

Misra, B.B.
1977 *The Bureaucracy in India*. New Delhi.

Morris-Jones, W.J.
1964 *The Government and Politics of India*. London, Hutchinson University Library.

Peters, G.
1987 Politicians and Bureaucrats in the Politics of Policy-making. In J. E. Lane, ed. *Bureaucracy and Public Choice*. London: Sage.

1978 *The Politics of Bureaucracy*. N.Y.: Longman.

Potter, D.C.
1963 The bureaucracy in India. In R. Braibanti, ed. *Asian Bureaucratic Systems*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Putman, R.
1975 Bureaucrats and Politicians: Contending Elites in the Policy Process. *Tulane Studies in Political Science* 15.

Pye, L.
1966 *Aspects of Political Development*. Boston: Little Brown and Co..

Rahman, A.T.R.
1974 Administration and Its Political Environment in Bangladesh. *Pacific Affairs* 47 (2).

Rabin, J. and J. Bowman
1984 *Politics and Administration: Woodrow Wilson and American Public Administration*. N.Y.: Marcel Dekkar.

Riggs, F.W.
1969 Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective. *Journal of Comparative Administration* 1 (1).

1963 Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View. In Joseph LaPalombara, ed. *Bureaucracy and Political Development*. N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Rourke, F.
1976 *Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy*. Boston: Little Brown.

Sayeed K.B.
1967 *The Political System of Pakistan*. Boston: Houghton Miffin and Company.

Sobhan, R. and M. Ahmed
1980 *Public Enterprise in an Intermediate Regime*. Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies.

Sobhan, R.
1993 *Bangladesh: Problems of Governance*. Dhaka: UPL.

Svara, J.
1985 Dichotomy and Duality: Reconceptualizing the Relationship Between Policy and Administration. *Public Administration Review* 45 (1).

Thoenig, J.
1978 State Bureaucracies and local Government in France. In K. Hanf and F. Scharg, ed. *Inter-organizational Policy-Making*. London: Sage.

Wilson, W.
1887 The Study of Administration. *Political Science Quarterly* 2.